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1. Overview  
This rapid review synthesises literature from academic, policy and NGO sources on the emerging 
trends of conflict and instability at both the country and localised level in Iraq. The report utilises 
literature published after November 2017 in order to focus on the current dynamics – with the 
failed Kurdish referendum, government retaking control of the disputed territories, territorial 
defeat of the Islamic State (IS),1 the rising influence of militias, and the protest movement in the 
south of Iraq. Additionally, this report examines the role of gender norms and masculinities in 
conflict in Iraq, however the literature is very limited in this regard and thus a slightly larger 
timescale is utilised (literature published since 2014). This review uses literature that was 
published up until September 2018 and therefore it is important to note that this is the middle of 
negotiations to form the government, which involves a number of political deals. The situation in 
Iraq is rapidly evolving and this review has demonstrated the current position, however this can 
change depending on the government that is formed and the policies they develop to deal with a 
range of issues highlighted in this report, ranging from Kirkuk to the protests in the south. 
Although it has become increasingly unlikely that the Prime Minister (PM), Haider al-Abadi, will 
remain in power, all possibilities of government formation are included in this report, as per the 
literature.2 
Community tensions and potential intercommunal conflict in Iraq may emerge over competition 
for resources as environmental and agricultural degradation, decrease of water resources, and 
historic lack of investment in infrastructure take its toll. Interconnected, displacement and 
migration are also likely to create tensions between communities, as well as competition over 
land and livelihoods of returnees post-IS. In the disputed territories, particularly Kirkuk, the lack of 
security provides the opportunity for intercommunal tensions to escalate over ownership, whilst 
the continued presence of militias also provides an opportunity for conflict. In wider Iraq the 
current government formation process is creating instability, whilst the protest movement3 has 
the potential to escalate, particularly as any new government will find it difficult to meet the 
protestors demands. The escalation of the protest movement has the potential to not only create 
conflict in the south – through the protestors and the government response – but also in the rest 
of the country as insecurity increases as a result.   
Other key findings are as follows: 
 The current government formation process has the potential to lead to conflict and 
instability, as there were no clear winners in the election in May 2018, competition has 
arisen between a number of parties, and any coalition will find it difficult to deliver on the 
electorate’s demands.  
                                                   
1 Although referred to as the Islamic State in this report, this term only came into being after a caliphate was 
declared on June 29, 2014, and it was formerly known, and is often still referred to, as the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). It is also 
often referred to as Daesh, which is based on the Arabic acronym of its name and has negative connotations. 
2 In September 2018 Abadi was outmaneuvered in the formation of the largest coalition and he all but ceded the 
premiership. 
3 There are currently protests over a range of issues from corruption to the lack of services and water. For more 
information see Section 4. 
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 Tensions between current PM Abadi and former PM Maliki have the potential to lead to 
conflict once the government is formed no matter who forms the largest bloc, as Maliki is 
backed by large sections of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), which poses an issue 
whether in opposition or in power.  
 The continued failure of the Iraqi government to decentralise governance to the provinces 
is likely to cause conflict and instability in the future if the new government does not 
rectify it. If Maliki’s bloc forms the government, conflict may emerge if he follows the 
same negative policies towards granting autonomy as seen during his term between 
2010-2014. 
 If decentralisation does happen, conflict could emerge in provinces with minorities, as 
current laws would allow for decisions to be made by an absolute majority, which would 
marginalise minorities.  
 The current protest movement originated in Basra and the instability created by it is of 
concern for Iraq, as Basra’s oilfields and sea export terminal account for an estimated 
95% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Further budget constraints could 
harm multiple post-IS programmes, which in turn would spread instability across the 
country. 
 Connected to the protest movement and the potential for violence, many PMF fighters 
come from Basra and have returned home armed and with military training and 
experience. Additionally, a number of slums have formed in the city, creating a space for 
militias and criminal networks to grow. These factors have already led to violence and 
could further deteriorate as the protest movement continues. 
 The worrying and violent rhetoric coming from some political elites, particularly within the 
Fatah Alliance, is of concern as the new government may decide to meet the protest with 
violence. 
 The spread of protests and the movement of troops to the south, paired with violence and 
instability would provide IS with increased space to act in territories where they still 
maintain a presence.  
 The continued existence of the PMF and lack of signs of demobilisation, its acting outside 
of the control of the PM, and it link to individual political parties is cause for concern for 
both conflict and instability in Iraq. Competition has already entered the political sphere 
and conflict has emerged with both local actors and the Iraqi army. 
 The current government formation could either further institutionalise and legitimise the 
PMF, or lead to them acting as opposition, which would allow them to exert pressure on 
the new PM and could lead to conflict and potentially instability. 
 The still unresolved nature of the boundaries and political control of the disputed 
territories is an issue that can lead to conflict once the new government is formed. This 
issue is particularly relevant in Kirkuk with its importance to the Kurds and recent re-
establishing of control by the Iraqi government. Insecurity has increased a great deal in 
Kirkuk recently and this can easily escalate into conflict if instability increases in Iraq. 
 In the Nineveh Plains, international actors are overly focusing their assistance on Yazidis 
and Christians, which creates inequalities amongst communities and this creates 
tensions between communities that may reinforce divisions and lead to conflict. 
 With no new justice system being formed to deal with IS, a range of actors are carrying 
out their own justice against suspected IS members, which creates community tensions 
and will create lasting instability. 
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 The lack of attention to post-IS reconstruction and reconciliation creates instability and 
has the potential to lead to conflict, whilst also exacerbating intercommunal tensions.  
 Due to the effects of climate change and the lack of water resources, diminished 
agricultural livelihoods increase the likelihood of local support for terrorist groups. 
 The lack of governance capacity to address and respond to climate change and 
environmental degradation are likely to lead to increased violent conflict and 
displacement. 
 The increased displacement and migration has the potential for conflict between host and 
displaced communities over renewable resources, scarce job opportunities and public 
services. 
 Diminishing incomes, and food and water insecurity, put pressure on remaining scarce 
resources, risking increased tensions within and between communities. 
 The insecurity, conflict and economic deprivation as a result of the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
have negatively affected women, their rights and gender equality in Iraq. 
 The gender quota system introduced in 2005 has not lead to the meaningful participation 
of women in politics and instead women who try to affect change are often marginalised. 
 High profile women in Iraq are often the target of abuse and violence, as they are seen to 
transgress the perceived moral codes and in the 2018 parliamentary elections a number 
of female candidates withdrew as a result. 
 Conflict in Iraq has led to the increase in hyper-masculinity, which in turn has resulted in 
the rise of domestic violence and the use of violence by public authorities against 
women. 
 In Iraq gender norms have led to a large percentage of women believing that physical 
domestic violence is justified under certain circumstances. 
 IS used gender-based and sexual violence in its attempts to form a hegemonic state and 
sexual slavery and the abduction of women was used as a form of domination over 
minorities, as well as a source of income.  
 The participation of women in conflict resolution, reconciliation, the prevention of 
violence, and the planning of relief needs, has been completely ignored.  
 As a result of the political marginalisation of women, much of the political change comes 
from civil society and is based on bottom-up pressure and gradual change, as well as 
more localised activities. 
 The restrictions placed on women as a result of displacement greatly hinder their 
participation in a number of domains and further cement conservative gender norms 
 Women who are suspected of family links to IS face sexual violence and exploitation, as 
well as being denied aid.   
 Public authority in Iraq is based on a patriarchal form of masculinity that is embedded in 
all parts of society, and state and non-state authorities connect sexual control and men’s 
control over women and girls with the ethnosectarian hierarchy.  
 Moral populism in Iraq is highly gendered and is based on conservative interpretations of 
Islam, which is reproduced and institutionalised by public authorities that use these 
gendered dimensions to reinforce their authority.   
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 The current context of displacement has opened up a space for gender norms to be 
renegotiated. Offering opportunities to strengthen gender norms that build trust and 
address gendered drivers that fuel community tensions.  
 The post-IS setting also opens the opportunity to strengthen women’s participation. For 
instance, during IS’ reign, the interpretation of well-being was extended so that women 
protected their children from joining IS, kept families safe, and stressed the importance of 
education, thus taking on duties of protection that were typically the domain of men. This 
is a possible entry point to strengthen women’s participation in the context of 
displacement as they seek employment and take part in household and community 
decision-making. 
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2. Conflict, Instability and Government Formation 
In the May 2018 Parliamentary elections, the turn out was very low at 44.5%, and in the capital, 
Baghdad, it was as low as 33%. There was also no clear winner in the election, or a visible path 
towards the formation of a coalition. The split in the Dawa Party of Nouri al-Maliki (former Iraqi 
PM: 2006-2014) on the one side and Haider al-Abadi (current PM: 2014-) on the other created to 
competing groups battling it out to form the largest coalition. Moreover, there were accusations of 
fraud in the elections with many of the results contested, particularly in the Kurdish Region and in 
Kirkuk. Additionally, the two coalitions that won the most seats - Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun 
Coalition and Hadi al-Ameri’s Fateh Alliance did well because they were perceived to be outside 
of the main political system. The turnout and the results were partly down to the population’s 
fatigue with conflict and endemic corruption and their loss of faith that any of these parties can 
tackle the issue. This therefore not only makes forming a government a difficult task, but once 
the government is formed it will be under immense pressure from the population to deliver 
services and tackle corruption, which could strain any coalition and lead to more protests and 
thus instability and violence. Moreover, due to the number of political parties that need to come 
together to form the largest bloc in the parliament there will inevitably be a number of competing 
and opposing political ideas involved and a number of sets of constituents that voted on different 
issues that need to be appeased (Mansour & van den Toorn, 2018). Again, which can lead to 
instability. 
Table 1 below demonstrates the key winners in the election and Table 1 and Table 2 
demonstrate the difficulty of forming a majority coalition and how many different political ideas 
must be incorporated in the coalition. 
Table 1: Key Winners in 2018 Iraq Election 
 
Source: Mansour & van den Toorn, 2018: 8 
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Table 2: Total Seats in Iraqi Parliament 
 
Source: Mansour & van den Toorn, 2018: 8 
There have been growing tensions between Abadi and the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF),4 
with Abadi accusing leaders of the PMF of politicising both it success against IS and its current 
importance for security for political gain, which is connected to the competition to form the largest 
bloc in parliament. The PMF Committee announced the removal of the PMF from several areas, 
which includes Sunni areas formerly held by IS. The accusation from Abadi is that this is in order 
to get Sunni parties to join the parliamentary bloc of Maliki and Hadi al-Ameri (leader of the Fateh 
Coalition). Abadi claims that this is unconstitutional and only the Commander-in-Chief (Abadi) 
can decide where the PMF goes. This demonstrates that if Abadi does become PM for a second 
term conflict may emerge between him and the PMF, whose leaders may use the force for 
political gain. If Abadi does not become PM for a second term, the premiership will essentially 
have its own independent security force, which can also lead to conflict, as it did during Maliki’s 
time (Hesse, Leathley, & Cafarella, 2018). 
3. Decentralisation and Instability 
Article 119 of the Iraqi constitution allows for the formation of new federal regions through a 
referendum in the province/s if requested by either one-third of the council members of each 
governorate intending to form a region, or by one-tenth of the voters in each of the governorates 
intending to form a region.5 Whilst Law 21, which was passed in 2008 and revised in 2013, 
                                                   
4 The PMF, also known as the Hashd al-Shaabi, is an Iraqi state-sponsored umbrella organisation composed of a 
number of militias. Although predominantly Shiite, there are also Sunni, Christian, Shabak, Yazidi, Turkmen, etc. 
militias. 
5 https://iraqmission.us/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/iraqi_constitution.pdf  
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allows for the devolution of significant powers to the governorates (Culbertson & Robinson, 
2017). However, decentralisation and further autonomy in Iraq has been constantly denied. Many 
governorates – including Anbar, Basra, Diyala, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Salah al-Din – have talked 
of or attempted to gain more autonomy, as is their constitutional right, but have been denied by 
the government. The former PM Maliki, outright denied or blocked any thoughts of devolution of 
power. Many of the governorates that attempted to gain further autonomy during Maliki’s 
premiership were taken over by IS, highlighting how the refusal to engage with decentralisation 
can lead to conflict (Isakhan & Mulherin, 2018; O'Driscoll, 2017). During PM Abadi’s term (2014-
present) the focus was on defeating IS and gaining back lost territory, thus although 
decentralisation was one of his early promises, this did not materialise. However, the issues 
surrounding decentralisation have not gone away and remains a significant challenge for the 
Iraqi central government, as governorates want the chance to develop and invest in their 
territory. Without a viable solution conflict could return, as argued by Isakhan and Mulherin 
(2018, p. 278): 
The future status of the regions freed from ISIS control and Kurdish claims over territories retaken 
by Iraqi forces in late 2017 certainly loom as significant challenges for Iraq’s political elite and for 
the integrity of the state as a whole. The potential for further conflict, renewed calls for 
decentralization, and outright secession remains very real.  
It is important to note that calls for decentralisation in Iraq are not for the ethnosectarian division 
of Iraq, but rather from territories that feel they have been ignored, particularly from a 
developmental perspective, or feel that the central government is failing to deliver on key 
economic and developmental goals. Basra is a good example of a governorate seeking 
autonomy based on these principles. Protests in Basra have turned violent and threats from 
Basra politicians that they would take control of oil fields and bypass Baghdad’s control, means 
conflict, as witnessed with the Kurds in Kirkuk, is a possibility. This does not necessarily mean 
that Baghdad needs to grant a number of governorates a federal region status, but real 
discussions on decentralisation and addressing the issues within these governorates are needed 
(Isakhan & Mulherin, 2018). Of particular concern should be if Maliki’s bloc forms the 
government, as conflict may emerge if he follows the same negative policies towards granting 
autonomy as seen during his term between 2010-2014. 
There is also the argument that the current form of Law 21 would not be suitable for a number of 
governorates that include minorities, as it allows for most decisions to be made through absolute 
majority. Absolute majority, as defined in the 2013 Amendment of the law, means 50% + 1 vote. 
In the current political climate in Iraq, and particularly in provinces with many minorities, this 
would lead to minorities being marginalised in the local-level decision-making process. This in 
turn could lead to conflict, particularly as many of these minorities now have their own militias 
within the framework of the PMF (Culbertson & Robinson, 2017).  
4. Protests, Instability and Conflict 
Linked to a number of the issues discussed in this report is the protest movement in Iraq calling 
for political change. Protests have covered issues such as corruption, decentralisation, bad 
governance, lack of public services, non-payment of government salaries, lack of investment in 
infrastructure, etc. and have emerged across the country, with the most recent movement 
emerging in the summer of 2018. These protests are demand-driven, rather than ethnosectarian 
in nature. Despite PM Abadi forming a detailed reform plan to address the concerns of the 
protestors, few inroads have been made. Protests in Iraq have often been met with 
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disproportionate violence, particularly during Maliki’s premiership, and protesters themselves 
have also turned violent (Yahya, 2017). Although protests have been a common summer 
occurrence in Iraq, the current protests in the south have escalated more than previous protests 
and serious instability is feared. Fifteen years on from the US-led invasion of Iraq, an 
accumulation of factors – including the effects of economic collapse, endemic corruption, severe 
environmental degradation, tribal and criminal violence, lack of investment in infrastructure, lack 
of employment opportunities, and poor governance and service provision – have led to the 
population losing faith in the traditional political system and its leaders. Many of these issues 
stem from years of neglect and will need a dismantling of the traditional patronage based political 
system and thus any new government will find it difficult to satisfy the demands of protestors. The 
dissatisfaction with the political system is clear in Basra, where only 14.4% of eligible voters 
voted in the 2018 parliamentary elections. This dissatisfaction paired with the scale of the 
problem and the significant long-term effort that will be needed to overcome the issues is a real 
concern for Iraq. It cannot afford long-term instability in Basra as Basra’s oilfields and sea export 
terminal account for an estimated 95% of the country’s GDP. Further budget constraints could 
harm multiple post-IS programmes, which in turn would spread instability across the country. It is 
also important to note that a large number of PMF fighters come from Basra and they have 
returned home armed and with military training and experience. Additionally, a number of rural 
people from the province and surrounding areas have moved into slums in the outskirts of the 
city due to land becoming infertile as a result of poor water supplies and salinity.  Not only has 
this further strained the capacity to deliver services, but it has also led to an increased 
concentration of people with serious grievances against the government. Moreover, the slums 
have created a space and an opportunity of militias and criminal networks to grow. All of this has 
led to mounting insecurity and violence in Basra, which have led to a real fear that the protest 
movement may lead to significant insecurity and violence across the country (Schweitzer, 2018). 
Additionally, there is a worrying rhetoric coming from some political elites, particularly within the 
Fateh Coalition, such as that the protests have been infiltrated by Saudi and Ba’athist elements. 
This is similar rhetoric to the Maliki era where protests were met by state violence and protest 
leaders were assassinated. Thus, if the Fateh and Maliki form the largest bloc, there is the real 
possibility that protests could be answered by state violence (Robin-D’Cruz, 2018). 
The accumulation of issues and no clear path to solving them is of particular concern in the 
current protests. Moreover, the use of force against the protestors sets a dangerous sign for the 
future, as both the tribes and militias are heavily armed. A stable Iraq without conflict between 
the population and the state, as well as a culture of lawlessness, is important in preventing the 
resurgence of IS. Thus, the protests in the south are a concern for conflict in the country as a 
whole. Many argue that these protests are different from those of the past and are not likely to go 
away unless real change is seen. This is particularly important as IS still exists as an insurgency 
group and routinely carry out attacks in Kirkuk, Diyala, Salah ah-din, and Anbar. Although they 
have been defeated territorially, they have not been conquered and are waiting for the 
opportunity for resurgence. IS has returned to the operation level and tactics of 2013 and are 
terrorising rural areas, particularly at night. The spread of protests and the movement of troops to 
the south, paired with violence would provide IS with increased space to act within (Hamasaeed, 
2018). Dodge (2018, p. 46) argues that ‘if nationwide political anger and alienation cannot be 
channelled into a coherent political movement… local-level political violence perpetrated by 
militias organised around moral–populist rhetoric can be expected’.  
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5. Militias 
The governance system in Iraq allows for ministries to become miniature fiefdoms with political 
parties taking control of them and utilising them for their own interests. As coalitions are formed 
after the election, the PM needs these parties on board to maintain the government, thus giving 
them a lot of power to push their own agenda. In this respect the militias that formed or reformed 
to fight against IS have never really been under the full control of the PM. Moreover, within the 
PMF many of the different groups form party militias. Due to these dynamics, as well as the 
popularity of the PMF following the defeat of IS, demobilising or integrating the PMF within the 
Iraqi army proves a difficult task. The divided and individualised nature of the PMF means that it 
is more likely to engage in violent conflict. For instance, there are a range of pre-existing conflicts 
across Iraq, particularly in Nineveh, and now the groups involved in these pre-existing conflicts 
control armed militias. The lack of governmental control over the PMF also means that there is a 
higher chance of them engaging in skirmishes with the Kurds in areas like Kirkuk, and there have 
already been threats of violence from individual militia members. At the wider level, the PMF 
forces have taken control of borders and gone to fight in Syria, despite the PM forbidding it 
(Mansour & ʻAbd al-Jabbār, 2017; O'Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017).  
Mansour (2018a) argues that if the PMF-linked political parties manage to form the government 
in the current government-formation process then the militias gain further institutionalisation and 
will directly take part in state re-building. However, if Abadi or Muqtada al-Sadr (whose coalition 
won the most seats in the 2018 elections) manage to form the next government the PMF and its 
allies will act as opposition, which will allow them to exert pressure on the new PM (as they will 
have a significant number of seats and influence due to their role in security) and could also lead 
to conflict. Thus, the government that emerges will impact the behaviour of the PMF, as they will 
either be separate forces in opposition, private forces within the government, or (although 
extremely difficult) integrated within the government. On the other hand, due to the more recent 
actions of elements within the PMF, such as extortion, checkpoints, looting, etc. conflict may 
emerge as the local population rebels against their presence. Additionally, conflict has emerged 
between the PMF and the Iraqi army in areas they jointly retook from IS. For example, in western 
Mosul in February 2018 there were clashes between the army and the Kataeb Sayed al-Shuhada 
militia over a dispute at a checkpoint at the ‘fourth bridge’ over the Tigris, the Kataeb also ended 
up briefly detaining four of the regiment’s troops. The International Crisis Group argues that ‘If 
Hashd fighters are not effectively demobilised and integrated into formal security structures or 
given civilian jobs, the destructive pattern established under PM Maliki could easily continue’ 
(International Crisis Group, 2018).  
6. Disputed territories and Intercommunal Conflict 
The disputed territories of Iraq are those areas that had their borders changed by the previous 
regime and now involve disputes over the ownership of these areas. They involve Kirkuk, Diyala, 
Nineveh, Salah al-Din and the provinces of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Although there 
are mechanisms to deal with the issue of the disputed territories,6 no government has 
                                                   
6 Article 58 of Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) called for the normalisation of the disputed territories of Iraq, 
followed by a census and then a referendum on the future constitutional status (in Kirkuk’s case whether it would 
join the KRI or not), whilst Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution calls for the implementation of Article 58 of the TAL 
by the 31st December 2007. 
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implemented them, whilst countless deadlines have passed (O’Driscoll, 2018a). Competition 
between rival ethnosectarian nationalisms within the disputed territories for ownership and 
control has already led to conflict, and is likely to continue to do so, as the issue of control 
remains unresolved. For instance there have been skirmishes between rival militias in Sinjar over 
control of territory, and as there is a vast number of ethnosectarian-based militias within Nineveh, 
competition for territory can easily turn violent (Kaválek, 2017; O'Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017). 
Additionally, competition between Kurds and Baghdad over ownership of Kirkuk has led to armed 
conflict between the Kurds on the one side and the Iraqi army and the PMF on the other. 
Although Baghdad has taken control of the area, the issue over ownership remains and the 
conflict has not been resolved and can therefore turn violent once again (O’Driscoll, 2018a). The 
competition over governance and the lack of cooperation between the Kurds and Baghdad has 
also led to a deterioration of the security in Kirkuk and has allowed remnants of IS to carry out 
attacks, which have increased immensely since October 2017 (Oxford Analytica, 2018). 
Nineveh has witnessed massive destruction as a result of IS and the battle to regain the territory. 
International organisations are taking the lead in reconstruction of houses and businesses, as 
well as in providing support for returning families. However, it is argued that some of these 
organisations’ actions are not conflict sensitive, particularly in the Nineveh Plains. Assistance 
tends to focus on Christians and Yazidis, whilst largely ignoring Shabaks and Arabs from the 
area.  Whilst there is a strong focus on preventing Christians and Yazidis from migrating away 
from the area, this creates tensions between communities that may reinforce divisions and create 
conflict. Table 3 below demonstrates how Shabaks feel they are being marginalised by non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), whereas Christians do not (Social Inquiry, 2018). 
Table 3: Perceptions of marginalisation by Christians and Shabaks in Nineveh Plains 
 
Source:  Social Inquiry, 2018: 3 
7. Post IS Intercommunal Conflict 
Justice has emerged as an issue in post-IS Iraq as it has created both conflict and instability. The 
unique justice dynamics that IS has created means that justice needs to be addressed in a new 
and innovative way. However, Iraq still relies on old laws that are not suitable, whilst provincial 
councils have used their authority to carry out decrees that only act to further conflict and 
instability. For instance, the provincial councils of Babylon and Salah al-Din have ordered the 
homes of IS suspects demolished and their extended families deported from the province. Many 
tribes have also enacted irreversible decisions, such as the destruction of homes of suspected IS 
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supporters. Because of the multiple actors involved in punishing those suspected of IS 
membership, Sunnis are being heavily prosecuted and collective guilt is being asserted, as many 
locally still connect being Sunni with being IS. Moreover, this is creating displacement and 
preventing return, whilst at the same time perpetuating many of the issues that led to the rapid 
rise of IS. The role of the PMF in controlling check points and vetting those allowed to return 
further complicates the issue, especially as they are often involved in delivering punishment, 
often on very limited evidence of guilt. In a time when community reconciliation is needed to 
move beyond conflict and towards reconstruction, actions such as these inhibit the process. The 
post-IS reconstruction, or lack thereof, is also a factor that can create conflict and instability. 
Moreover, the lack of processes towards reconciliation in multi-ethnic and multi-sectarian areas 
such as Nineveh are failing to address cyclical violence in Iraq. Whilst continued competition for 
the territory between multiple actors creates instability, at the same time ignoring the local 
population’s needs (O’Driscoll, 2018b; Parry, 2018). 
The number of displaced people in Iraq and the continued return process (as demonstrated in 
Map 1 and Map 2) creates instability in Iraq. Returnees face difficulties in returning to their 
residences due to significant damage and/or lack of legal documentation for houses, and in some 
cases their houses are occupied. The enhanced competition for resources, land ownership and 
limited livelihoods in areas with poor security has the potential to lead to intercommunal conflict, 
particularly as more people return without significant investment in the process (IOM, 2018). 
Map 1: Internally displaced people in Iraq 
 
Source: https://bit.ly/2QuV2Lh 
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Map 2: Returnees in Iraq 
 
Source: https://bit.ly/2QuV2Lh 
8. Climate-related Local and National Conflict  
Climate change in Iraq has resulted in prolonged heat waves, erratic precipitation, higher than 
average temperatures and increased disaster intensity. The country also has the lowest level of 
water since 1931 and the flows of Iraqi rivers have decreased by 40%, which is also negatively 
impacting on food security. Poor water management has also led to high salinity of water, 
particularly in the south. The climate in Iraq is expected to get worse in the coming years putting 
further strain on water resources, agriculture and living conditions. By 2050 annual average 
rainfall is projected to decrease by 9%, whilst mean annual temperatures are expected to 
increase by 2 degrees Celsius. Additionally 92% of the total area of the country is at risk of 
desertification (Hassan, Born, & Nordqvist, 2018). 
The Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks has highlighted five main security 
risks in Iraq relating to climate: 
Diminished agricultural livelihoods increase local support for terrorist groups: Water 
shortage and higher temperatures negatively impact agricultural output and farmers’ ability to 
harvest crops. With one quarter of Iraq’s population dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods, 
climate-related issues undermine livelihood security and threaten peace and stability in affected 
provinces. Yet investment in the agricultural sector remains poor despite it being the second 
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largest employment sector. Livelihood insecurity can provide an opportunity for terrorist 
recruitment, particularly in areas liberated from IS. IS has previously used water shortages and 
food shortages to target particular communities by gaining support in exchange for access to 
basic resources, livelihood security or other services not provided by the state. Therefore water 
management and agricultural investment are closely connected to stabilisation, security, and 
peace (Hassan et al., 2018). 
Insufficient governance capacity to address and respond to climate change and 
environmental degradation: Corruption, poor governance, wars, UN sanctions and the legacy 
of the Saddam Hussein regime have weakened Iraq’s economy and the state’s capacity to 
mitigate the impacts of climate change and modernise water infrastructure and the agriculture 
sector. The battle against IS further deprioritised water security issues, which has worsened the 
state of the infrastructure. The Ministry of Water Resources has an ambitious 20-year plan to 
modernise Iraqi infrastructure, however it lacks the financial means and capacity to implement 
the project. Likewise, the Ministry of Agriculture receives one of the smallest allocations from 
Iraq’s national budget, which is mainly spent on salaries and pensions, rather than infrastructure 
investment. Consequences such as violent conflict and displacement are becoming increasingly 
likely but have not been integrated into post-IS recovery plans (Hassan et al., 2018).  
Increased dependence on water flows from neighbours and regional stability: Iraq’s rivers 
flow in from its neighbours making it dependent on them for water. As climate change causes 
more erratic rainfall in the region, Iraq is becoming more dependent on regional stability to 
maintain its access to water. Dam projects in Iran and Turkey (Iraq receives 80% of its water 
from Turkey) are partly responsible for Iraq suffering its worst water shortage crisis for 80 years. 
Destabilisation in neighbouring countries – through either conflict or reduced rainfall – will further 
expose Iraq. To date there are no official agreements or frameworks in place for the sharing of 
water in the region and thus Iraq is vulnerable to any disagreements on economic, socio-political 
or other security issues, particularly with Turkey (Hassan et al., 2018).  
Mass displacement and forced migration: The combination of neglected infrastructure, 
increased rainfall variability, and dam projects in neighbouring countries could increase the risk 
of displacement and forced migration along Iraq’s populous rivers. Seven million people, across 
five provinces live along the banks of the River Tigris. The Ilisu Dam in Turkey still needs to 
become fully operational, but it is estimated that once it is it will reduce the water supply to Iraq 
by 60%. Increased temperatures, prolonged periods of drought and intensified dust and sand 
storms are likely to reduce agricultural production and have significant impacts on livestock 
production and communities’ livelihoods. This would be likely to increase the risk of displacement 
and migration in search of better livelihood and resource conditions. The livelihoods of hundreds 
of thousands of people would be affected, potentially causing displacement and forced urban 
migration. As a result, the potential for conflict between host and displaced communities over 
renewable resources, scarce job opportunities and public services might increase. This is 
particularly true in areas that lack sufficient institutional capacity to mitigate such risks (Hassan et 
al., 2018). According to UNOCHA (2018) approximately 630 families (3,780 people) have already 
been displaced in the south of Iraq, as low water levels and salinity have made it impossible for 
them to survive on agriculture. 
Heightened communal tensions over access to food and water: Climate variability and 
change have strong implications for livelihoods and access to basic resources, such as food and 
water. This is especially the case for rural communities that are dependent on agriculture for their 
livelihoods and marginalised communities. Diminishing incomes, and food and water insecurity, 
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put pressure on remaining scarce resources, risking increased tensions within and between 
communities. This is particularly the case in rural and marginalised communities where sufficient 
adaptation and mitigation policies have not been put in place. For example, in southern Iraq 
diminishing water resources have already led to demonstrations and local clashes over water 
rights (Hassan et al., 2018).  
The water scarcity in Iraq is a serious issue, and along with the lack of electricity, employment, 
and endemic corruption is responsible for the protest movements in the south. There are fears 
that the water crisis in Iraq will drive conflict – through migration, localised conflict, and civil 
unrest. Both climate related issues and the historic lack of investment and maintenance of 
infrastructure are responsible for the current state of affairs that have made some form of conflict 
related to water inevitable. Protests have already turned violent and there have been a number of 
tribal disputes that have turned violent over water resources for agriculture (Luchtenberg, 2018). 
9. Gender Norms 
According to Dodge et al. (2018:18) the 
insecurity, conflict and economic deprivation that followed the invasion of 2003 have significantly 
affected women, their rights and the overall status of gender equality in Iraq. The impact of the 
intervention and its aftermath has been mostly negative for Iraqi women; they have become more 
exposed to violence and their socio-economic rights have deteriorated.  
Prior to the 2003 invasion, economic sanctions led to the restriction of the role of women in 
education and the labour force and thus reinforced conservative gender roles, which have 
deteriorated further since 2003. Although a gender quota system in elections and parliament was 
introduced in 2005 this did not lead to the meaningful participation of women in politics. Instead 
women, and movements, that challenged the patriarchal hegemony were/are excluded (Dodge et 
al., 2018). Moreover, the 2018 parliamentary elections saw a number of female candidates 
withdraw as a result of online harassment, abuse, and threats, often of a sexualised nature 
(VAWG helpdesk, 2018). Whilst a number of professional women have been killed for 
transgressing perceived moral codes (Fraser & Bell, 2016).  
The transformation since 2003 has put further limits on, and increased control of, women. 
Conservative gender norms in Iraq make it more likely for women to keep houses than to enter 
the labour market (Dodge et al., 2018). Moreover, the participation of women in conflict 
resolution, reconciliation, the prevention of violence, and the planning of relief needs, has been 
completely ignored. Women have also been marginalised in the formulation of a draft Anti-
Domestic Violence law. As a result of the political marginalisation of women, much of the political 
change comes from civil society and is based on bottom-up pressure and gradual change, as 
well as more localised activities (VAWG helpdesk, 2018). 
The internal conflicts that followed the 2003 invasion have led to a failure to provide security, 
which has greatly affected women. Dodge et al. (2018) argue that conflict in Iraq has led to the 
increase in hyper-masculinity, which in turn has resulted in the rise of domestic violence and the 
use of violence by public authorities against women. A further issue with gender norms in Iraq is 
that a large percentage of women believe physical domestic violence is justified under certain 
circumstances, as demonstrated in Table 4 (Fraser & Bell, 2016). Part of the issue is that Iraq 
has a long history of sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in the process of statebuilding. 
The use of SGBV was also taken up by IS in its attempts to form a hegemonic state. For 
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instance, sexual slavery and the abduction of women was used as a form of domination over 
minorities, as well as a source of income. Additionally, this acted as a way of creating more 
children for the caliphate, who would be brought up under its doctrines. Forced and arranged 
marriages were also used to create bonds and loyalty amongst IS and thus IS’ form of 
masculinity was used to underpin its attempted statebuilding practices (Ahram, 2018). 
SGBV services are limited in Iraq and there is a stigma about seeking help and a fear from 
women of damaging their own reputation. Moreover, displacement from conflict also limits the 
services that women are able to access. As a result, women who seek help are more likely to 
report to their family. SGBV has been used against women as part of conflict in Iraq, particularly 
by IS, but also by the security forces. At the same time the gender norms and hyper-masculinity 
that exists in Iraq has led to an increase of homophobic attacks and many Islamic clerics have 
urged their followers to eradicate homosexuality from Iraq (Fraser & Bell, 2016).  
 
Table 4: Violence against women and girls 
 
Source: Fraser & Bell, 2016:4  
Conflict in Iraq, particularly concerning IS, has led to a significant number of internally displace 
people (IDPs) and displacement has more negative impacts for women than for men. There is an 
increase in domestic violence in displacement settings, women are more vulnerable to trafficking 
and prostitution, and there are more restrictions placed on them by their family and community. 
These restrictions greatly hinder women’s participation in a number of domains and further 
cement conservative gender norms (Dodge et al., 2018). Additionally, in displacement settings, 
women who are suspected of family links to IS face sexual violence and exploitation. At the same 
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time, these women are often denied aid and if they manage to return home the situation is often 
worse, with evictions and multiple forms of abuse commonplace (VAWG helpdesk, 2018). 
Dodge et al. (2018) argue that public authority in Iraq is based on a patriarchal form of 
masculinity that is embedded in all parts of society. As part of this state and non-state authorities 
connect sexual control and men’s control over women and girls with the ethnosectarian 
hierarchy. Similarly moral populism in Iraq is highly gendered and is based on conservative 
interpretations of Islam. This is then reproduced and institutionalised by public authorities that 
use these gendered dimensions to reinforce their authority.   
In 2017 Oxfam Iraq carried out a study on the role of gender and conflict in IS-affected 
communities in Iraq. The study was based on 629 household surveys, 24 Focus Group 
Discussions, and 32 Key Informant Interviews across Salah al-Din, Anbar, and Mosul. The study 
found that the prevailing gender norms of participants were based on a gendered difference and 
division of labour, with men seen as protectors and providers and women in charge of wellbeing 
and domestic activities. Under IS’ rule a strict radicalised version of gender norms were imposed 
where women were separated in public and had strict rules based on their attire and daily 
practices. Due to the violent repercussions people followed IS’ vision of gender norms, however 
have reverted back to their previous traditional gender norms since the territorial defeat of IS. 
Nonetheless, the current context of displacement has opened up a space for gender norms to be 
renegotiated. For instance, during IS’ reign, the interpretation of well-being was extended so that 
women protected their children from joining IS, kept families safe, and stressed the importance of 
education, which had been dismantled by IS. As a result, there was a slight shift in gender norms 
and power dynamics, where women took on duties of protection that were typically the domain of 
men. Oxfam argues that this is a possible entry point to strengthen women’s participation in the 
context of displacement as they seek employment and take part in household and community 
decision-making. These changing roles and the concern of access to livelihoods in the 
displacement setting, allows for a further negotiation in gender norms. Additionally, men have 
extended their understanding of their role as protectors to include being a good role model in 
order to mitigate future tensions within the community (Dietrich & Carter, 2017). 
Oxfam argue that interventions should ensure equal access to humanitarian and recovery 
assistance for men and women and should also include shifts in gender norms. Additionally,  
interventions should address gender drivers that fuel conflict, whilst enhancing those gender 
drivers that contribute to building trust and strengthening community cohesion. Oxfam put 
forward a number of recommendations to achieve this (Dietrich & Carter, 2017). 
To address gendered drivers that fuel community tensions:  
 Diversify income generation opportunities to counter the idea of men as sole income 
providers.  
 Contribute to gender shifts in unpaid care work by reducing the stigmatisation of men 
who carry out these duties.  
 Enhance targeted interventions to reach vulnerable (single/unmarried) women increasing 
peer-support structures.  
To enhance gendered drivers that build trust: 
 Create safe spaces for women and girls to support their collective organising efforts.  
 Seize opportunities to enhance women’s meaningful participation at community level.  
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 Work with men and boys to promote alternative gender roles as positive role models.  
 Create and reconstructed safe public spaces that enable gender mixed community work.  
 Support local women’s rights defenders and their organisations.  
 Contribute to an inclusive, women-led and accountable Women, Peace and Security 
Agenda.  
In an overview of the role of masculinities in conflict Myrttinen, Khattab, and Naujoks (2017) 
demonstrate that analyses of men and boys as agents of violence focus on the notion of violent, 
militarised masculinities being hegemonic. Whereas, they argue that a more nuanced approach 
should be taken to understand the relationship and the complexity between masculinity and 
violence. Additionally, they argue that the understanding of masculinity in conflict needs to be 
broadened to include non-violent masculinities, as the current focus on violence only acts to 
reinforce the relationship between men and violence and does not offer space for alternative 
ways of being a man. Therefore, it is important that the study of masculinities in conflict does not 
only focus on hegemonic masculinities.   
Myrttinen et al. (2017) also argue of the importance of studying and addressing ‘thwarted 
masculinity’7 which is important in the context of Iraq with its large number of displaced people. 
Within displacement it is difficult for men to take up ‘traditional’ masculine roles and act as 
provider and protector. Although this is an opportunity to change gender roles, as argued by 
Dietrich and Carter (2017) above, it can also lead to destructive behaviour of men, including 
domestic violence and criminal activity. Therefore, international actors need to also take this 
dynamic into account in their interventions through helping to reframe the understanding of 
masculinity and ensuring equality in their actions (Myrttinen et al., 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
7 Thwarted masculinities refers to ‘masculinities of men who are bound by expectations of living up to dominant 
notions of masculinity in the face of realities which make it practically impossible to achieve these, leading to 
frustration and at times various forms of violence, against both others and oneself’ (Myrttinen et al., 2017, p. 108).  
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